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The Art of Compromise
Legislative Deliberations on Marine Insurance Institutions 
in Antwerp (c. 1550-c. 1570)1
dave de ruysscher and jeroen puttevils
Dave De Ruysscher and Jeroen Puttevils look into the complex interaction – typical 
of the Low Countries – between various stakeholders (economic agents, city 
government and central government) that shaped the legislation of economic 
practices. Eschewing top-down (the central government imposes its rules) and 
bottom-up (merchants sought to have their customs legalised) models, and taking 
into account the powers enjoyed by city governments in the Low Countries, which 
were both ample but also constrained by the central government, the authors trace 
the development of one particular type of contract and transaction – sixteenth-
century marine insurance, a growing sector for which Antwerp became the key 
centre. By laying bare the negotiation process which preceded the compromise, they 
find that decisions on the legislation regarding marine insurance were both politically 
and economically induced. The three major agents (merchants, city government 
and central government) were not monolithic blocs: within the Antwerp mercantile 
community different opinions on marine insurance and its legislation could be heard. 
There were ‘national’ differences and small-time insurance purchasers thought 
differently about state legislation than their larger colleagues and insurers. Parties 
with political clout also had a stronger voice in negotiations.
De kunst van het compromis. Onderhandelingen over wetgeving voor het 
zeeverzekeringswezen in Antwerpen (c. 1550-c. 1570)
De wetgeving rond economische praktijken in de zestiende-eeuwse Nederlanden 
werd in belangrijke mate bepaald door de complexe interactie tussen verschillende 
belangengroepen (economische agenten, stedelijke overheid en centraal gezag). 
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Dave De ruysscher en Jeroen Puttevils zijn van mening dat top-down (de vorst legt 
zijn regels op) en bottum-up modellen (kooplieden willen hun gewoonten omgezet 
zien in wetten) weinig afdoend zijn en stellen zich vragen bij de reikwijdte van de 
macht van stedelijke overheden. Door op zeeverzekering te focussen, een praktijk die 
sterk groeide in de zestiende eeuw en waarvoor Antwerpen een belangrijk centrum 
werd, wordt het onderhandelingsproces en het zoeken naar een compromis tussen 
de verschillende belangengroepen duidelijk. De beslissingen over wetgeving 
waren daardoor het resultaat van zowel politieke als economische dynamieken. De 
verschillende belangengroepen werden door interne spanningen gekenmerkt: zo 
verschilden Antwerpse handelaars qua participatie in de zeeverzekeringssector, 
‘nationaliteit’ en contacten met de politieke machthebbers.
Introduction
The recent synthesis by Oscar Gelderblom on commerce in Bruges, Antwerp 
and Amsterdam from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries proposes a 
new perspective on the political economy of trade. Intercity competition and 
adaptive efficiency of town magistrates in policy-making are put forward as 
the main reasons for institutional change in the realm of commerce. Cities 
were incentivised by profits made through trade and therefore tried to cater 
to the many needs of merchants (as concerning for example, property rights, 
infrastructure, debt recovery) in order to attract and retain this otherwise 
highly mobile community. According to Gelderblom, monarchs did little 
more than acknowledge the autonomy of the governments of commercial 
towns, leaving them the agency to structure the institutions in their markets. 
City magistrates continuously adjusted their municipal legal system to 
respond to changing commercial strategies of merchants.2 The results of 
these developments were open-access institutions at the local level, which 
can be defined as sets of ‘rules which apply uniformly to everyone in society, 
regardless of their identity or their membership in particular groups’.3
This contribution, which focuses on sixteenth-century Antwerp, 
challenges Gelderblom’s ideas in two respects. First, it zooms in on policy-
making by the central government in matters of mercantile contracts. The 
historical evidence demonstrates that princely officials did not merely back 
the legislative powers of the Antwerp aldermen in this respect: their actions 
went beyond occasionally urging local measures or imposing minimal, yet 
1 The authors wish to thank John Eyck, the editors 
of bmgn - Low Countries Historical Review and 
the anonymous reviewers for the corrections on 
earlier versions of this text.
2 O. Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce: The 
Institutional Foundations of International Trade 
in the Low Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton 
2013) 2.
3 S. Ogilvie and A.W. Carus, ‘Institutions and Economic 
Growth in Historical Perspective’, in: P. Aghion 
and S.N. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic 
Growth (Amsterdam etc. 2014) 403-513, 429.
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irksome, control following complaints.4 Instead, officers and representatives 
of the central government actively engaged in creating institutional 
structures. This framework was forged by both the municipal and the princely 
authorities, which resulted from the institutional intertwinement between 
both levels of government and from their mutual consultations.
Secondly, this contribution emphasises that decisions of commercial 
policy, the mechanisms producing them as well as the constraints that lay 
at their basis were not exclusively economic, but rather both political and 
economic.5 The processes that produced legislation were fundamentally 
political, in fact. Even though the growth of commerce might have 
strengthened the positions of successful trading cities in the Low Countries 
vis-à-vis the princely authorities there, and in particular in Antwerp, they 
still remained ‘bargaining metropoles’ that had to negotiate with their 
sovereign.6 The Antwerp pensionaris and one of the mayors-aldermen of 
the city (the buitenburgemeester or ‘external burgomaster’) represented the 
municipal government with central institutions such as the Privy Council, 
the Council of Finance and the Council of Brabant, and they were involved 
in regular conferences.7 Princely councils in turn involved local governments 
in their legislative process because of their expertise, and because they were 
responsible for the implementation of central ordinances. Late medieval and 
early modern policy-making then, was a combination of deals and diplomacy.
Gelderblom argues moreover, that municipal governments pursued a 
policy of open access – the Antwerp market and its institutions were open to 
all merchants – because of mounting market integration and corresponding 
changes in commercial strategies among merchants.8 Local magistrates sensed 
what the optimal institutions were in a changing economic environment. 
Following on that, they devised new rules or selected conventions from 
foreign merchants that guaranteed the lowest transaction costs and debt 
enforcement for their local merchant community, adapting their municipal 
laws accordingly.9 By doing so, according to Gelderblom, local officials 
overcame the legal heterogeneity that went together with the presence of the 
many merchant groups inclined to stick to their own rules and customs.10 
4 Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 119 (Charles 
V insisting on procedural reform following 
complaints) and 120-121 (the Duke of Alba 
imposing the appointment of a commissioned 
registrar of insurance policies, without infringing 
on the competences of the Antwerp judges in 
insurance matters).
5 Ibid., 199-200.
6 W. Blockmans, ‘Voracious States and Obstructing 
Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in Preindustrial 
Europe’, Theory and Society 18 (1989) 233. Also: 
Ch. Tilly and W. Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of 
States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800 (Boulder 1994); 
D. Stasavage, States of Credit: Size, Power, and the 
Development of European Polities (Princeton 2011).
7 G. Marnef, Antwerp in the Age of Reformation: 
Underground Protestantism in a Commercial 
Metropolis, 1550-1577 (Baltimore 1996) 18-19.
8 Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 201-203.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 13-14, 133.
article – artikel
However, as will be demonstrated in what follows, despite the fact that growth 
and expanding networks invited institutional adaptations, the concrete open-
access solutions crafted by the magistracy of the cities and the officers of the 
central government were not fully determined by the phenomena named by 
Gelderblom. Rather, rules prescribing and regulating the contents of contracts 
were the product of a frequently long search for a compromise between 
authorities of the municipal and central governments, members of their 
political elite and groups of traders, all with different levels of enterprise and 
political clout. In point of fact, all of them had varying views on whether an 
open-access policy was appropriate and on what open-access rules of contract 
should look like, views that did not per se depend on the laws of the home 
regions of foreign merchants, yet which were not devoid of power play and 
particularism.
The key points for the alternative proposition presented here can be 
demonstrated in the well-documented and intense debate on the rules and 
organisation of the market for marine insurance in Antwerp in the third 
quarter of the sixteenth century.11 Shifts in the Antwerp market around 1550 
prompted a reassessment of the legal regime applying to marine insurance. 
Under this heated discussion came compulsory registration of contracts, 
limitation of the number of brokers and their appointment by the authorities, 
and legal rules underpinning the contracts. These conditions were debated 
in negotiations between groups of merchants, the authorities of the prince 
and of the city of Antwerp, and the views of members of each group naturally 
differed. At the start representatives of the princely government had ideas 
that were in some respects stricter than those of the other political players. 
These central officials in Brussels, as well as some large insurers, preferred 
compulsory registration of contracts and centralised brokering. Such 
policies, however, were fiercely opposed by the groups of occasional and 
smaller insurance underwriters and insurance purchasers. The local Antwerp 
11 A case comparable to the one regarding marine 
insurance is the formation of monopolies, as 
in the Antwerp wine and grain trade yet also in 
other branches of commerce. Such arrangements 
also concerned rules of contract and involved 
the interests of the governess-general, as well as 
subsequent princely legislation and combined 
action of the municipal and central governments. 
See: J. Craeybeckx, ‘Prijsstijging, monopolisme en 
pre-mercantilisme. De regering der Nederlanden 
en de groothandelaarsimporteurs van Franse 
wijn (1541-1549)’, Handelingen van de Koninklijke 
Commissie voor Geschiedenis 151 (1985) 380-407;  
J. Craeybeckx, Un Grand Commerce d’Importation: 
Les Vins de France aux Anciens Pays-Bas (13e-16e 
Siècle) (Parijs 1958) 211-228; A. van Dixhoorn, ‘The 
Grain Issue of 1565-1566: Policymaking, Public 
Opinion, and Common Good in the Habsburg 
Netherlands’, in: E. Lecuppre-Desjardin and  
A.-L. Van Bruaene (eds.), De Bono Communi: The 
Discourse and Practice of the Common Good in 
the European City (13th-16th C.) (Turnhout 2009) 
171-204; H. Soly, ‘Economische vernieuwing en 
sociale weerstand. De betekenis en aspiraties 
der Antwerpse middenklasse in de 16de eeuw’, 
Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 83 (1970) 522 and 530.
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government was also reluctant to devise terms of contract intended to serve 
as a standard in marine insurance negotiations and hesitated with regard as 
to which measures were necessary. However, once the Antwerp leaders were 
convinced to draw up rules of thumb on the contents of contracts, they – and 
also the princely commissioners – acknowledged contractual provisos that 
had been crafted by merchants, among them a couple that were even rejected 
by merchants of some nations (as these groups of foreign residents were 
commonly called). As a result of all this negotiating, it took some fifteen years 
before positions changed and a legislative framework could be set up that 
provided for standard rules of contract shared by all players in the Antwerp 
insurance market. Even so, although it had already been additionally decided 
in compromises, centralised registration of contracts remained vulnerable to 
contestation.
Antwerp marine insurance in the middle of the sixteenth century: a market in transition 
meets with swift princely actions
In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries marine underwriting was 
exported from Spanish and Italian cities to Bruges.12 When at the end of the 
fifteenth century Antwerp took over from Bruges as a result of the Flemish 
Revolt against Maximilian of Austria, many foreign merchants who had been 
trading in Bruges also moved on to Antwerp, taking with them their know-
how in insurance. Around 1520 premium insurance thus became occasionally 
practised in Antwerp, and it rose steadily in popularity among larger groups 
of merchants there when, around the turn of the 1520s, brokers offered 
services of premium underwriting at the Antwerp Exchange.13
Notionally, a premium contract of marine insurance (a policy) was 
signed by one or more underwriters (insurers), who stipulated the payment 
of a sum of money for losses resulting from the various perils of naval trade 
(usually encompassing shipwreck, seizure or capture by pirates or privateers 
and the like). Premium insurance could be for parts of value of a ship or 
of merchandise. Typical was that premium underwriters themselves were 
neither vendors nor charterers of the insured merchandise. When a merchant 
wanted to cover the risk of shipping his merchandise, he contacted a broker. 
The broker thereupon solicited merchants for insurance, thus negotiating 
the price (the premium) and the portion of value to be insured. The premium 
12 J.P. van Niekerk, The Development of the Principles 
of Insurance Law in the Netherlands from 1500 to 
1800 I (Kenwyn 1998) 7, 201.
13 For the importance of the Antwerp Exchange in 
the dispersal of premium insurance at Antwerp 
in the first half of the sixteenth century, consult: 
D. De ruysscher, ‘Antwerp 1490-1590: Insurance 
and Speculation’, in: A. Leonard (ed.), Marine 
Insurance: Origins and Institutions: 1300-1850 
(London 2015).
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
A ship sails in peaceful waters towards a harbour. 
However, many ships stranded or sunk in the 
 treacherous coastal waters. Notice the cannons 
providing protection to the ship and its cargo. 
Engraving by Hieronymus Cock after an original by 
Pieter Brueghel the Elder (1565).
Museum Plantin-Moretus/Prentenkabinet 
( Antwerp).
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was expressed as a percentage of the insured value.14 If the risk was high, the 
premium was a higher percentage. Data as to the route of the vessel, the state 
of the ship and the season of travel was communicated by the brokers. That 
information in turn allowed insurers to assess the risks that they were taking 
and to adapt the premium rate accordingly.15 When the risk materialised the 
underwriters were obliged to pay out compensation, which corresponded to 
the value that they had insured. In Antwerp insurers were supposed to pay 
within two months following the substantiated claim of the insured. When a 
ship had gone missing and no tidings had been received though, the insured 
could not provide proof of loss. Under those circumstances, after one year 
he was entitled to forfeit his ownership of the insured cargo or ship to his 
insurers in exchange for the compensation that was agreed upon.16
In the 1530s and even in the 1540s, insurers in Antwerp were nearly 
always Italians or Spaniards. In the first decades of the sixteenth century, 
many shipments to the Low Countries had been insured with premium 
underwriters outside Antwerp, at Bruges for example17, and also abroad. 
Thus in the 1490s and early 1500s premium insurance policies were signed 
at Burgos, for example, for alum transports from Mazarrón and Cartagena, 
as well as for shipments of wool and pastel from Bilbao and Bordeaux to 
the Southern Netherlands.18 From around 1520, when premium insurance 
was eventually offered at Antwerp, it were initially the Antwerp-based 
merchants from southern Europe who practised it there, as purchasers and as 
underwriters. Even in the 1530s and early 1540s Netherlanders at Antwerp 
and elsewhere took out premium insurance in Antwerp only infrequently19, 
14 In general, on the distinctive features of premium 
insurance, see: Van Niekerk, The Development, vol. 
1, 1-87.
15 For the Antwerp practice of calculating premium 
rates, see: H.L.V. De Groote, De zeeassurantie 
te Antwerpen en te Brugge in de zestiende eeuw 
(Antwerp 1975) 138-140. Also: G. Ceccarelli, ‘The 
Price for Risk Taking: Marine Insurance and 
Probability Calculus in the Late Middle Ages’, 
Electronic Journal for History of Probability and 
Statistics 3:1 (2007) 1-26.
16 See footnote 42.
17 De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 17.
18 H. Casado Alonso, ‘Comercio internacional y 
seguros marítimos en Burgos en la época de los 
Reyes Católicos’, in: Bartolomeo Dias e a sua época 
(Porto 1989) 606-608.
19 For the period between 1530 and 1550, data can 
be found in four contracts (of 1531, 1535 and 
1541); two other documents referring to marine 
insurance (of 1540 and 1543); sources reflecting 
ten lawsuits before the Antwerp municipal court 
(hereafter amc), concerning marine insurance 
(of 1540 and of between 1542 and 1549); and six 
references to insured parties in a broker’s ledger 
(1549-1550). In four of the 22 insurance contracts 
referred to in these sources, the insured was 
Dutch. See Antwerp City Archives (hereafter 
aca), Notaries (hereafter n), 2070, f. 95v-96r (22 
October 1535), 3133, f. 375 r-v (12 October 1540); 
aca, Vierschaar (hereafter v), 1241, f. 48v-49v 
(deed of judgment amc, 7 May 1547); De Groote, 
De zeeassurantie, 119 (contract, 7 June 1535). For 
mentions of insured parties from Southern 
Europe (in sixteen of the 22 contracts referred 
to), see: aca, n, 3133, f. 36r (contract 12 February 
1541 n.s., listing insured parties from Spain and 
underwriters); aca, v, deeds of judgment of 
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and only occasionally signed insurance policies as underwriters.20 At the same 
time, the strategy of extending the liability of the shipmaster or charterer 
to naval risks in a contract (charter or carriage contract) continued to be 
applied as an earlier strategy of handling such naval ventures, one already 
practised by Dutch, German and French traders in the first two decades of the 
sixteenth century.21 Moreover, in the 1530s and 1540s the mostly southern 
European underwriters of premium insurance, and also policy holders, were 
typically prominent businessmen trading on a large scale, often involved in 
international finance as well.22
the amc: 1237, f. 23v-24v (31 October 1542) and 
f. 50v-51r (22 November 1542), 1238, f. 62r (17 
September 1543), 1241, f. 4r (1 March 1548 n.s.), 
1242, f. 50v-52r (10 April 1548 n.s.), f. 111v (14 July 
1548), and f. 270v (12 January 1549 n.s.); J. Denucé, 
L’Afrique au XVIe siècle et le commerce anversois 
(Antwerp 1937) 93-96 (broker’s ledger, six 
entries of 1549); J.A. Goris, Étude sur les colonies 
marchandes méridionales (portugais, espagnols, 
italiens) à Anvers de 1488 à 1567 (Louvain 1925) 641 
(summons for compensation, August 1543); A. 
Wijffels, ‘Business Relations between Merchants 
in Sixteenth-Century Belgian Practise-Orientated 
Civil Law Literature’, in: V. Piergiovanni (ed.), From 
Lex Mercatoria to Commercial Law (Berlin 2004) 
256-259 (court case amc, 1540).
20 Of the 22 mentioned references to insurance 
contracts, only three concern contracts in which 
Dutchmen were insurers, among others. See: 
Goris, Étude, 641-642 (summons, August 1543, 
containing the names of 54 underwriters, among 
them 31 Italians, 11 Spaniards, and three Dutchmen: 
Jacques de Cordes, Balthazar de Cordes and 
Aert Nieulant); aca, v, 1242, f. 111v (14 July 1548, 
defendant-underwriter Aert Nieulant) and f. 270v 
(12 January 1549 n.s., defendant-underwriter 
Jacques Le Moins). Eighteen of the mentioned 
22 references relate to Southern-European 
underwriters. Sources not cited in the previous 
footnote, and referring nearly exclusively to 
Southern-European underwriters, are: aca, v, 1241, 
f. 48v-49v (deed of judgment amc, 7 May 1547); 
A. Hofmeister, ‘Eine Hansische Seeversicherung 
aus dem Jahre 1531’, Hansische Geschichtsblätter 
5 (1886) 169-177 (insurance contract, July 1531, 
containing the names of 44 underwriters, of 
whom 41 were Spaniards, Portuguese and Italians).
21 Archives of the Realm in Antwerp, Notaries, 522, 
f. 57r-58r (carriage contract, 22 July 1525) and f. 
63r-64v (carriage contract, 31 July 1525). These 
two contracts were signed by Dutch shipmasters 
for a German merchant, Joachim Pruner. An 
example of liability by the charterer is: M.A. 
Drost (ed.), Documents pour server à l’histoire du 
commerce des Pays-Bas avec la France jusqu’à 1585: 
Actes notariés de La Rochelle, 1423-1585 (The Hague 
1984) 32-34 (23 and 24 March 1537 n.s.). Extended 
liability of shipmasters is not found in those 
carriage contracts signed for Spanish or Italian 
merchants, who in the 1540s still mostly relied 
on Southern-European shipmasters. See: aca, n, 
3133, f. 73r-74r (carriage contract, 20 March 1540); 
aca, Certificatieboeken (hereafter cb), 5, f. 18r 
(certificate of chartering, 28 August 1542) and 
f. 43r (certificate of chartering, 28 August 1542), 
and aca, cb, 6, f. 41r-v (certificate of chartering, 
21 April 1544); Goris, Étude, 630-632 (carriage 
contract, 21 June 1540). For the preponderance 
of Southern-European shipmasters shipping 
merchandise of Antwerp-based Spaniards and 
Italians in the 1540s, see Goris, Étude, 162-167.
22 E. Coornaert, Les Français et le commerce 
international à Anvers, fin du XVe-XVIe siècle (Paris 
1961) vol. 2, 238-239. Among those signing the 
mentioned 1531 insurance policy were prominent 
merchant bankers and financiers such as Giovanni 
Carlo d’Affaitadi, Gaspar Ducci and Ruiz Fernandez. 
See Hofmeister, ‘Eine Hansische Seeversicherung’, 
173-177. On policy holders before 1550, see: De 
Groote, De zeeassurantie, 19-20 and 119-120.
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Around mid-century the Antwerp insurance market underwent new 
transformations that put pressure on the balance of interests in insurance 
contracts and on the mechanisms of contract formation at play. The ledgers of 
the Spanish insurance broker and Antwerp resident Juan Henriquez reveal an 
intriguing insight into this changing insurance market. In his time Henriquez 
was the most prominent marine insurance broker in Antwerp and in the 
period from 1 August 1562 to 24 September 1563 his business was so vibrant 
and voluminous that he dominated the brokerage market.23 Henriquez 
registered the identities of merchant-charterers and insurers, the destinations 
and the insured values for 1,621 insurance policies.24 The policies concerned 
marine insurance for cargos shipped to and from the Iberian Peninsula, the 
Mediterranean, (western) Africa, the American and Asian colonies, France, 
Britain and northern Europe. The accounts for each insurer and policy holder 
allow a breakdown of the insurance activities of both groups.
Merchant 
origin
Estimated number 
of merchants active 
in Antwerp
Number of 
insurers
% of total 
insured 
value
Number 
of policy 
holders
% of total 
insured 
value
Spain & Portugal 450 89 45.54% 87 36.74%
Italy 200 31 25.30% 34 21.20%
Low Countries 500 46 24.72% 113 35.37%
Germany 300 2 2.55% 6 0.42%
France 100 4 1.81% 13 6.19%
England 400 1 0.08% 2 0.08%
Table 1. Underwriters and policy holders brokered by Juan Henriquez by merchant group in 1562-1563.25
23 Henriquez was mentioned by name in the 
standard policy form imposed by the central 
government in October 1563, and was in his 
time considered essentially monopolous. See: 
De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 152, 154. It was not 
a coincidence that Henriquez was suggested 
by Cornelis De Schepper, a senior government 
administrator, as an advisor on insurance to 
Mary of Hungary, the governess-general of 
the Low Countries (September 1551), see: L. 
Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands: State, 
Economy and War at Sea in the Renaissance 
(Leiden 2004) 258, footnote 186. In Antwerp 
some £ 583,856 gr. Fl. was brokered by Juan 
Henriquez in the period of August 1562 until 
September 1563. In February 1558, it was 
said that some other brokers (their number 
is unknown) earned between 200 and 300 
guilders (£ 33 to £ 50 gr. Fl.) yearly in insurance 
brokering (aca, Privilegiekamer (hereafter 
pk), 1019, 127 (petition, February 1558)), which 
would correspond to an insured value of 
between £ 13,200 and £ 20,000 gr. Fl. (the 
brokerage fee was 0.25% of the value insured). 
Henriquez’ share in the brokerage market can 
be estimated as very high.
24 aca, Insolvente Boedelskamer, 2314-2315. The 
data from these ledgers has been elaborated 
in: A. Wastiels, Juan Henriquez, makelaar in 
zeeverzekeringen te Antwerpen (1562-1563)  
(Master’s thesis, Ghent University 1967).
25 Source: Wastiels, Juan Henriquez, 870-884. 
Merchant group size estimates are based on: 
W. Brulez, ‘De handel’, in: W. Couvreur (ed.), 
Antwerpen in de XVIde eeuw (Antwerpen 1975) 
128-131; Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 33.
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From this data (Table 1) it is evident that by the early 1560s the Antwerp sector 
for marine insurance had become more international. Iberian and Italian 
merchants were still figuring prominently as underwriters but they had been 
joined by many more merchants from the Low Countries. Moreover, the books 
of Juan Henriquez show that in the early 1560s occasional and small-scale 
underwriters and policy holders, who were more often Netherlanders than 
before, participated in the insurance sector as well.26 Opening up the Antwerp 
insurance market proved a distinct challenge for the existing infrastructure: 
before about 1550 most parties that were involved in insurance had belonged 
to the same circles of elitist financiers and traders. As a result, constraints in 
insurance contracting had hinged on reciprocal sociability and reputation 
management, which occasionally – when insured and underwriter had the same 
nationality – could be enforced by the leaders of their nation.27 As interests 
expanded however, with insurers and policy holders coming from a growing 
and diverse group of traders, the market was becoming more anonymous.
On top of these challenges caused by market growth and increased 
interaction, the Antwerp insurance market was hit by an exogenous shock in 
the later 1540s and early 1550s: raids of Scottish and French privateers caused 
an increase in the litigation between policy holders and insurers waged before 
the Antwerp municipal court of aldermen. Registered deeds of judgment 
of the years mentioned demonstrate that lawyers for marine underwriters 
repeatedly attempted to refute the many claims for compensation with which 
they were confronted.28 As early as 1548 these events triggered the interest 
of Mary of Hungary, the governess-general of the Netherlands, who asked 
her councillors to report on what was transpiring in the Antwerp insurance 
market.29 An initial action in response to the problems then, came from the 
central government. Following the councillors’ advice, drafts of legislation 
were drawn up, the contents of which reveal a notable change in policy.
26 De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 155-156.
27 The 1541 contract mentioned (aca, n, 3133, f. 
36r) is an example of marine insurance in which 
only Spaniards (most probably Castilians) were 
involved. Nations judged among members only. 
On peer pressure exerted within nations, see B. 
Blondé, O. Gelderblom and P. Stabel, ‘Foreign 
Merchant Communities in Bruges, Antwerp and 
Amsterdam, c. 1350-1650’, in: D. Calabi and S.T. 
Christensen (eds.), Cities and Cultural Exchange in 
Europe, 1400-1700 (Cambridge 2007) 159.
28 aca, v, deeds of judgment of the amc concerning 
insurance claims following the capture or 
abduction of a ship: 1241, f. 4r (1 March 1548 n.s.), 
f. 48v-49v (7 May 1547), 1242, f. 50v-52 (10 April 
1548 n.s.), and 1244, f. 25v (17 October 1555). Other 
deeds of judgment of this period refer to average 
calculations following capture: aca, v, 1242, f. 127r 
(18 August 1548), 1244, f. 60v-61 (24 December 
1555), f. 126v-127v (12 March 1556 n.s.), and  
f. 128-130 (1 April 1556 n.s.).
29 Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands, footnote 
152 (letter, June 1548). See also General Archives 
of the Realm in Brussels (hereafter garb), 
Papiers d’État et de l’Audience (hereafter pea), 
1633/1, Letter of the Audience of the governess-
general to provincial princely councils, 14 
January 1549 (n.s.).
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Whereas in 1537 a princely ordinance had regulated the enforcement 
of claims from marine insurance contracts30, in 1548 the central government 
of the Netherlands went one step further. Until then projects of ordinance 
mostly concerned the arming of ships and the fitting-out of convoys, for 
it was thought that insured ships were less armed and thus more prone to 
capture. Here however, even though the purpose of the ordinance was to 
reduce the use of marine insurance, for the first time rules were also fixed for 
determining the contents of marine insurance contracts. Furthermore, these 
rules were devised as open-access institutions: they would apply to all parties 
to insurance contracts made in Antwerp, irrespective of their status or nation. 
The princely actions thus conformed to the open access policy of the Antwerp 
municipal court in matters of marine insurance. However, in contrast to the 
Antwerp aldermen-judges, the princely initiative was concerned not merely 
with rules of procedure and debt recovery (as demonstrated below) but 
also with contractual content. In the earliest stages of the proposal princely 
councillors were asked to seek the opinions of merchants with expertise in 
the matter.31 Their consultations with merchants (among them members of 
the Castilian consulate in Bruges), captains and seamen of ports in the Low 
Countries took place in 1549, and draft ordinances were distributed and 
amended with their comments.32 One such draft, dating from June 1549, 
limited the portion of merchandise that could be insured to one third for ships 
that did not sail to the Mediterranean; in addition, versions of the ordinance 
also ruled out hull insurance policies. When the subsequent princely law was 
finally issued in January 1550 though, it allowed for some open-access terms 
of insurance contracts providing for example, that any marine insurance of 
cargo would encompass a maximum of nine tenths of its value33, while also 
30 Ch. Laurent, Jules Lameere and H. Simont (eds.), 
Recueil des Ordonnances des Pays-Bas (S.l. 1893), 
2nd series, vol. 4, 34-35 (Princely ordinance, 
25 May 1537); O. De Smedt, ‘De keizerlijke 
verordeningen van 1537 en 1539 op de obligaties 
en wisselbrieven. Eenige kanttekeningen’, 
Nederlandsche Historiebladen 3 (1940) 15-21.
31 garb, pea, 1633/1, Letter of the Audience of the 
governess-general to provincial princely councils, 
14 January 1549 (n.s.) ‘[...] visiter ladite minyte et 
en communicquer a aulcuns bons personaiges 
marchans et aulcuns de votre gens eulx 
cognoissans en telz affaires [...]’.
32 L. Sicking, ‘Los grupos de intereses marítimos de 
la Península Ibérica en la ciudad de Amberes: La 
gestión de riesgos y la navegación en el siglo XVI’, 
in: J.A. Solórzano Telechea, M. Bochaca and A. 
Aguiar Andrade (eds.), Gentes de mar en la ciudad 
atlántica medieval (Logroño 2012) 169 and 177.
33 For the ordinance, see: Recueil des Ordonnances des 
Pays-Bas, 2nd series, vol. 6, 3-13 (19 January 1550 
n.s.). On the history of this ordinance, see besides 
Sicking, ‘Los grupos’: L. Sicking, ‘Stratégies de 
réduction de risque dans le transport maritime 
des Pays-Bas au XVIe siècle’, in: S. Cavaciocchi 
(ed.), Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare, secc. 
XIII-XVIII (Prato 2006) 797-798 and J. Craeybeckx, 
‘De organisatie en de konvooiering van de 
koopvaardijvloot op het einde van de regering 
van Karel V. Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van de 
scheepvaart en de admiraliteit’, Bijdragen voor de 
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 3 (1949) 188-193.
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Heavily armed ships were one of the options to 
protect one’s commodities but they too could meet 
stormy weather, heavy seas and marine creatures.
Engraving by Hieronymus Cock after an original by 
Pieter Brueghel the Elder (c. 1541-1560).
Collections artistiques de l’Université de Liège.
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permitting hull insurance policies under certain conditions.34 It seems then, 
that the opinions of consulted merchants had indeed been taken into account.
An outsider’s proposal
In October 1555, Giovanni Battista Ferrufini, a merchant who had probably 
come from Piedmont but who by that time resided in Antwerp, submitted a 
petition to the Council of Finance of the Netherlands. In his official request 
he complained about daily discussions and lawsuits in Antwerp, and about 
the ‘deceit and abuse’ (‘tromperies et abuz’) in marine underwriting in that 
city. Ferrufini proposed to make it mandatory for all merchants engaging in 
marine insurance policies in Antwerp to have their insurance contracts drawn 
up by a public broker. This official would devise the contents of insurance 
contracts in the ‘best form possible’ and arrange for their authentication with 
the sovereign’s seal by an assistant notary. This certification served the purpose 
of distinguishing the policies from other – unofficial – contracts, which were 
not able to be brought to court. Ferrufini clearly intended to make a profit: 
without calling it by its name, his proposal actually comprised a monopoly 
combining insurance brokerage with said registration. Moreover, he proposed 
to establish the function of public broker in the form of an office, which was 
to be granted to a beneficiary ad vitam. Ferrufini asked the prince to award 
him the office in exchange for an annual sum of 500 guilders (£ 83.33 gr. Fl.), 
which would be paid for the remainder of his life after a trial period of ten 
years, a remunerative proposal for the central government. Ferrufini would 
furthermore profit from his proposal to charge for each insurance contract 
0.25 percent of the value insured.35
Even so, some features of Ferrufini’s request point to the fact that 
its author was not firmly embedded in the Antwerp insurance scene. To his 
petition a statement was added that had been signed by thirty-three Antwerp-
based merchants of different nationalities, supporting Ferrufini’s project, and 
which confirmed the mentioned brokerage rate as being common in Antwerp. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these merchants declared they insured freights, 
this rate was true for only a minority of them. Six of the merchants endorsing 
Ferrufini’s proposal were mentioned as insurers in the accounts of Henriquez, 
dating a few years later, and six as insurance purchasers, among them four 
of the former six underwriters.36 For six others, indications are that they 
34 Sicking, ‘Los grupos’, 197.
35 garb, pea, 145, f. 136r-v, Request of Giovanni 
Battista Ferrufini to the Council of Finance, 1 
October 1555.
36 The underwriters were Alessandro Bonvisi, 
Jeronimo de Salamanca, Anton del Rio, Jacob 
Lang, Marcos Nunez Perez and Christopher 
Pruynen. The insurance purchasers were Bonvisi, 
del Rio, Lang, Pruynen, Giovanni Battista Sforzoso 
and Jeronimo Spinosa.
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were insurance underwriters at some point in their life.37 Nevertheless, the 
other (nineteen) endorsing merchants do not appear to have been involved 
in insurance in Antwerp.38 All of them did belong to the highest stratum 
of the mercantile community of the city though. They included prominent 
bankers and royal representatives, such as Anton Palos, who was the agent 
of the Portuguese king, and Lazarus Tucher, who had been financial agent 
of the Habsburg emperor. It is likely that Ferrufini matched the same profile 
of outsider: there are no traces of his being involved in insurance, as policy 
holder or underwriter, before October 1555.
Ferrufini then, gathered support for his largely self-interested proposal 
from merchants with whom the central institutions were acquainted, but 
he was mistaken in assuming seemingly oligarchic features of the princely 
legislative procedure. Ferrufini considered it a top-down process, whereby the 
central government imposed regulation on cities, most probably because he 
knew about the princely practice of consulting prominent merchants. ‘Principal 
merchants’ (‘marchands principaulx’) such as the ones listed after Ferrufini’s 
petition were often asked by the prince and his advisors for their opinion on 
matters of trade, or for drawing up reports on such issues.39 Ferrufini had 
deliberately not informed the Antwerp government of his petition, despite two 
Antwerp aldermen (Fernando de Bernuy and Johan Verheyden) having signed 
37 aca, v, 1242, f. 270v (12 January 1549 n.s., 
defendant-underwriter Gaspar Schetz); 1244, 
f. 63r-66r (24 December 1555, defendant-
underwriter Diego de Santa Cruz); Goris, Étude, 
641-642 (summons, August 1543, Diego de Santa 
Cruz and Silvestro Cattaneo underwriters); 
C. Wyffels, ‘Een Antwerpse zeeverzekeringspolis 
uit het jaar 1557’, Handelingen van de Koninklijke 
Commissie voor Geschiedenis 113 (1948) 103 
(contract 8-9 February 1557, underwriter 
Galeotto Magalotti); Hofmeister, ‘Eine Hansische 
Seeversicherung’, 174 (member of the Micheli 
family and Giovanni Carlo d’Affaitadi).
38 Some may have worked with another broker 
than Henriquez. Yet sources of the later 1540s 
and of the 1550s, reflecting marine insurance 
practice in Antwerp, do not mention one of the 
nineteen merchants named who stood with 
Ferrufini: aca, cb, 10, f. 43r (18 May 1555) and f. 
273v (July 1555) 11, f. 201v (11 April 1556), 12, f. 149r 
(17 November 1557), 14, f. 16r-v (19 June 1559) 
and 15, f. 159r-160r (24 April 1550); aca, v, 1243, f. 
309r-310r (deed of judgment amc, 20 May 1553, 
mentioning seven underwriters), 1244, f. 25v (17 
October 1555) and f. 64r-66r (24 December 1555, 
mentioning twenty-one underwriters); Denucé, 
L’Afrique, 93-95 (66 insured, 1550-1556). It is 
possible but unlikely that many of the merchants 
signing Ferrufini’s statement passed away or left 
the city shortly after October 1555. For seven 
of the nineteen supporters, there is ample 
evidence that they stayed in Antwerp until the 
1560s. Additional data can be obtained from the 
authors.
39 See, for example, garb, pea, 1635/1, Letter of 
councilor Albert van Loo to the governess-
general, 14 October 1553 (referring to a 
consultation by Lazarus Tucher on the effects of 
the postponement of payment at the Antwerp 
fair that was imposed by central decree), and 
garb, pea, 1737/3, f. 419r-420r (letter of 30 
October 1565, written by Gaspar Schetz, who was 
the Habsburg factor from November 1555, to the 
governess-general and regarding the impact of a 
monopoly that was granted in the grain trade on 
the Antwerp market).
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the added statement on their own behalf. However, consulting usually also 
involved local magistrates and stakeholders (as will be seen below).
What is more, the outsider characteristics of Ferrufini’s proposals 
are shown clearly by their contents. In his petition Ferrufini referred to the 
‘commun stille ès escriptures et polis des dictes assurances’ (the common style 
in contracts and policies of said insurance)40, and later, when in April 1557 
he clarified some of his ideas, he claimed that brokers often falsely presented 
new practices and provisions of contract as usages and customs (‘soubz umbre 
de cesdictz uz et coutumes’).41 However, even though Ferrufini envisaged 
these notions as reflecting rules of thumb and as having commonly known 
contents, since he did not define them in any way, not many of these rules 
were known in the Antwerp insurance business around 1555. In the period 
between 1488 and 1555, deeds of judgment of the Antwerp municipal court 
of aldermen contain only few references to ‘customs’ relating to marine 
underwriting and naval accidents that were brought forward as arguments 
in the courtroom. Moreover, although such mentions of customs concerned 
open access rules that were imposed by the municipal court on all members 
of the urban mercantile community, they mostly related to procedural issues 
and delays and they did not so much concern actual terms of insurance.42 As 
for the contents of contracts, there were virtually no municipal or mercantile 
standards. As late as the 1560s the nation of Castilians in Bruges emphasised 
that no one knew what the marine insurance customs of Antwerp regarding 
contractual provisions were, even though around that time reference was 
commonly made to the ‘customs of the Antwerp Exchange’ in insurance 
40 agrb, pea, 145, f. 136r (request of Giovanni 
Battista Ferrufini to the Council of Finance, 1 
October 1555). See also: P. Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste 
Ferrufini et les assurances maritimes à Anvers au 
XVIe siècle’, Bulletin de la Société de géographie 
d’Anvers 7 (1882) 197; D. Moscarda, ‘L’italiano 
Giovan Battista Ferrufini, sovrintendente alle 
Assicurazioni in Anversa’, in: E. Capuzzo and E. 
Maserati (eds.), Per Carlo Ghisalberti: Miscellanea 
di Studi (Napels 2003) 80. All historians writing 
on Ferrufini’s proposal (including Jan Goris, 
Emile Coornaert, Wilfrid Brulez, Hans Pohl, 
up to Gelderblom) based their accounts on 
Génard’s article; therefore, they will not be cited 
hereafter.
41 aca, pk, 1019/120, Further explanations by 
Giovanni Battista Ferrufini, April 1557. See also: 
Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 204; Moscarda, 
‘L’italiano Giovan Battista Ferrufini’, 83.
42 They regarded procedural periods of payment of 
compensation by the underwriters (two months, 
one year), the sharing of damages that had been 
produced during the saving of a ship over all those 
having freights in that ship (i.e. gross or general 
average) and the rule that insurance after loss was 
legitimate only if the insured had been unaware of 
the loss. The possibility for an insurance purchaser 
to forfeit his rights of ownership on insured 
merchandise to the underwriters of the insurance 
contract, after one year, was also described as a 
custom. See: aca, v, deeds of judgment of the amc: 
1239, f. 117v and f. 138v (19 July 1544). On the sharing 
of damages: aca, v, 1241, f. 104r (16 July 1547), f. 283r 
(8 March 1548 n.s.), 1244, f. 61r (24 December 1555), 
and f. 126v (12 March 1556 n.s.). On the lawfulness 
of insurance after loss: aca, v, deeds of judgment 
of the amc, 1241, f. 49r (7 May 1547), 1242, f. 51v (10 
April 1548 n.s.) and 1238, f. 62r (17 September 1543).
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contracts.43 Ferrufini admitted this practice to a certain extent in his 1557 
additions as well, because he insisted on the need for a princely law, which he 
stated was necessary because customs of Antwerp regarding marine insurance 
had ‘not been declared’ (‘ne fusrent oncques déclairés’).44
To his 1557 clarifications Ferrufini thus added a standard policy, 
containing what he considered to be ‘the style’ and ‘the customs’ of contracts 
of marine insurance in Antwerp. Given the sparse number of existing Antwerp 
insurance customs and the lack of rules relating to provisions in insurance 
contracts, Ferrufini had devised a common style of insurance policies in his 
model standard contract, rather than defending an existing one. The mandatory 
insurance contract that he proposed, in addition to his call for princely 
legislation imposing it, can be considered arguments underscoring Ferrufini’s 
largely pretended aim for the common good. Notwithstanding, Ferrufini’s 
contribution to the development of Antwerp marine insurance lay in the fact 
that he was the first to submit a proposal of extant legislation regulating many 
terms of contract in response to fraudulent practices and general lack of security 
in the insurance sector. Ferrufini anticipated princely concerns therefore, which 
had become public in the central government’s law of 1550 and in another one 
of 155145, and he set in motion a process that would ultimately bring about 
standards for terms in insurance contracts in the Antwerp market.
From consultation to protest to legislative negotiations
The central authorities responded to Ferrufini’s petition by seeking 
additional information. The Council of Finance delegated the issue to Gaspar 
43 See: S.M. Coronas González, ‘La ordenanza de 
seguros maritimos del consulado de la nación de 
España en Brujas’, Anuario de historia del derecho 
54 (1984) 390, footnote 18 ‘[...] el qual uso y 
costumbre [of Antwerp] nunca se a visto por 
escrito, ny ay persona que sepa el dicho uso ny 
costumbre [...]’; Ch. Verlinden, ‘Code d’assurances 
maritimes selon la coutume d’Anvers, promulgué 
par le consulat espagnol de Bruges en 1569’, 
Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor de 
uitgave der Oude Wetten en Verordeningen van België 
16 (1950) 60 (referring to the introduction to the 
French printed version). It seems that this remark 
concerned the ongoing situation of confusion 
as to standards in terms of contract, and that it 
did not follow on from differences between the 
1563 princely law (see further) and practices of 
the Antwerp municipal court. The references to 
‘customs of the Antwerp Exchange’ in insurance 
contracts, from the later 1550s onwards, do not 
point to a set of customs, but rather to general 
insurance practices (especially when combined 
with a reference to the customs of the London 
Strada, which was still common in the 1560s) or 
to mercantile usages known in Antwerp and/
or (mostly procedural) practices of the Antwerp 
municipal court in matters of insurance.
44 Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 203; Moscarda, 
‘L’italiano Giovan Battista Ferrufini’, 82.
45 Recueil des Ordonnances des Pays-Bas, 2nd series, 
vol. 6, 163-177 (princely ordinance, 19 July 1551) 
(s. 18-22).
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Schetz for analysis. As trading agent of the sovereign, Schetz was one of the 
‘principal merchants’ close to the monarch and he had expertise in marine 
underwriting.46 Although he had endorsed Ferrufini’s claims by signing the 
added statement regarding the brokerage remuneration, he was appointed 
to carry out further investigation. A conflict of interests of this kind was not 
unusual. ‘Principal merchants’, among them supporters of Ferrufini’s proposal, 
were thought to represent the community of all merchants in Antwerp47 – 
even if they were not unanimous in their opinions – and to be leading experts 
in mercantile matters.48 In his report Schetz confirmed that the Antwerp 
insurance market was quite chaotic and required princely regulation, namely 
with a mandatory contract form; he also favoured Ferrufini’s proposal that one 
officer centralise the writing and registration of all policies, but he added that 
more had to be paid to the treasury of the prince. Already at that time Schetz 
expected disagreement among Antwerp’s merchants.49 On 5 December 1556 
Schetz’ report was sent to the Antwerp magistracy for further counsel on the 
feasibility of Ferrufini’s projects and on the wishes of merchants.50 These 
actions therefore make evident that – in contrast to Ferrufini – the princely 
authorities aimed at seeking legislation that was broadly backed by the 
Antwerp government and its resident merchants.
In the following years these endeavours at consulting resulted in a 
joint undertaking in which princely and foremost municipal commissioners 
sought to draw up an ordinance containing rules that were likely to be 
accepted by merchants trading in Antwerp. This enterprise was another 
consequence of protests against the Ferrufini proposal. Reactions materialised 
in October 1557 and in February 1558, when the plans became known in 
their entirety.51 Afterwards, many merchants residing in Antwerp who did 
not agree with Ferrufini’s intended monopolisation of the brokering and 
registration of insurance contracts, submitted elaborate petitions to the 
Antwerp government.52 In total, no less than 165 merchants rose up against 
46 See footnote 37; A. Louant, ‘Gaspar Schetz, seigneur 
de Grobbendonck, facteur du roi d’Espagne à 
Anvers (1555-1561)’, Annales de l’Académie royale 
d’archéologie de Belgique 77 (1930) 315-328.
47 garb, pea, 1191/41, 43 (in 37), Project of (princely?) 
ordinance, c. 1547. This (aborted) project, dating 
from the later 1540s, foresaw the installation of a 
court of merchants in Antwerp. Four ‘presidents’, 
who were ‘principal merchants’ because they were 
thought to represent all merchants in the Antwerp 
market, would oversee the election of judges.
48 See for example garb, pea, 1633/1, Letter of 
the Audience of the governess-general to the 
provincial princely councils, 14 January 1549 (n.s.).
49 aca, pk, 1019/104, Report of Gaspar Schetz, 8 
October 1556. See also Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste 
Ferrufini’, 201-202.
50 Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 203.
51 Ibid., 216. Initially, the plans were not widely 
disclosed. From Italian proposals (see footnote 
57) it seems that only the leaders of (some?) 
nations had known of Ferrufini’s plans, and not all 
members of nations.
52 aca, pk, 1019/127, Petition of merchants, February 
1558, 128, Petition of merchants, 13 October 1557 
and 130, Petition of merchants, end of 1557. Génard 
published 127 (Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 
215-233) as well as another petition dating from 1557 
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Ferrufini’s plans.53 Entire groups of foreign merchants trading in Antwerp 
were mobilised in the protest. In the turmoil nine of Ferrufini’s former 
supporters changed sides.54 To gauge potentially different interests within 
the mercantile community (larger versus smaller insurers and insurance-
takers), the present study has linked the names of those of who endorsed 
the 1555 Ferrufini proposal and the names of the protesters with the 1562-
1563 accounts of Juan Henriquez, the aforementioned marine insurance 
broker, thereby determining the extent of their marine insurance activities. 
Seventeen merchants mentioned in the Henriquez ledgers as insurers who did 
not purchase insurance themselves signed the 1557-1558 protests, together 
with thirty-five who were active as underwriters and insurance purchasers, 
in addition to twenty-seven traders who only bought insurance. The analysis 
shows that the few insurers and insurance purchasers in the pro-Ferrufini 
group who were also clients of Henriquez were mostly underwriting and 
insuring for large values. The 1557-1558 protesters therefore, were to a great 
extent policy holders who insured for lower values.55
Position regarding 
Ferrufini
Insurers Insured
N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Pro in 1555 6 6,765.81 5,672.16 6 9,994.58 10,321.73
Contra in 1557 52 4,274.76 7,832.14 62 4,472.62 6,229.21
Table 2. Position in regard to the Ferrufini-proposals of underwriters and policy holders brokered by Juan Henriquez 
in 1562-1563 (insured value, in £ gr. Fl.).56
(213-214) and a list of names of protesters (210-212), 
of which the original could not be found (Génard 
does not provide a reference to the source; the 
list of names dates from February 1558, not from 
October 1557 as is suggested in Génard’s article).
53 Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 210-212, 213, 233. 
The names have been entered into a database file 
that can be obtained from the authors. aca, pk, 
1019/128 and 130 do not contain names.
54 These were Giovanni Carlo d’Affaitadi, 
Alessandro Bonvisi, Anton del Rio, Jacob Lang, 
Zacaria Leccaro, Galeotto Magalotti, Bartolomeo 
Micheli, Manuel Riccio and Giovanni Battista 
Sforzoso. See Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 
199-200, 210-212, 233. Jacob Lang, Alessandro 
Bonvisi, Anton del Rio and Giovanni Battista 
Sforzoso are mentioned in Henriquez’ ledgers 
of 1562-1563. For the others, with the exception 
of Zacaria Leccaro and Manuel Riccio, there are 
indications that they were at some point active as 
underwriter as well (see above).
55 An independent, two-tailed samples T-test 
(means) for the means of the total insured value 
(through Henriquez) of 1555 proponents and 
1557 antagonists of Ferrufini’s proposal reports 
a statistically significant difference of means 
(p=0.05) (equality of variance assumed: Levene’s 
test for equality of variance, p>0.05). Data can be 
requested from the authors.
56 Source: Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 210-
212, 233, 247; Wastiels, Juan Henriquez, 870-884. 
Abbreviation St. Dev. in table: standard deviation.
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In October 1557 protesters reacted against the intended monopolisation in 
brokerage and registration. In February 1558 protest grew even stronger, 
despite the fact that Ferrufini had adjusted his initial plans to some extent. 
Specifically, some prominent members of Italian nations had argued 
that elected merchants should be appointed as brokers or registrars of 
insurance contracts.57 In response, Ferrufini proposed that, next to one 
‘superintendent’, who was meant to act as registrar, there would be four 
commissioned brokers.58 As a result of this proposal, important nations or 
foreign communities could elect a member to oversee insurance contracts 
and receive commissions. Moreover, the leaders of the Genoese nation 
lobbied for appointed merchants writing the insurance ordinance59 as well 
as a model for the insurance contract.60 Lobbying efforts stopped though, 
because of protests advanced by the majority of merchants – for a large part 
small-scale insurance purchasers and underwriters – in favour of freedom in 
selecting brokerage. They considered the softened monopoly of centralised 
registration and brokerage by way of four commissioners to be a significant 
breach of mercantile liberties, and their protest caused those advocating the 
four-broker model to concede. In February 1558, merchants of all nations – 
among them earlier supporters of Ferrufini and leaders of the Genoese nation 
– subsequently stressed that they should be able to choose their insurance 
broker freely, as well as the clauses of the contracts, and that no registrar 
should be appointed.61
Notably, the lobbying efforts mentioned above did not concern nations 
arguing in favour of the law of their home region62, even though discussions 
most probably also touched upon some insurance techniques that were 
not accepted by every nation.63 This topic had much to do with a conviction 
that in contractual matters local law had to apply. The rulers of the Genoese 
nation for example, stressed that it was the Antwerp aldermen who issued an 
57 aca, pk, 1019/98, Petition, s.d., in Italian, proposing 
four elected brokers assisted by a scrivener 
and 100, Petition of merchants, s.d., early 1558, 
probably nation of Lucca, proposal to appoint an 
alderman as registrar having two merchants as 
assistants.
58 Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 216.
59 aca, pk, 1019/119, Petition of the Genoese nation, 
s.d., early 1558.
60 A model contract was at some point proposed 
by Italian merchants. See aca, pk, 1019/186, Short 
report, s.d.
61 Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 215-232.
62 aca, pk, 1019/100, Petition of merchants, s.d., early 
1558 and 119, Petition of the Genoese nation, s.d., 
early 1558.
63 An example is barratry, which was loss due to the 
conduct of the captain or his crew. In the mid-
sixteenth century, it was not accepted in Genoa 
and in Spanish insurance centers, whereas in the 
Low Countries, London and Rouen it was a risk in 
cargo insurance policies for which underwriters 
commonly provided coverage. See G. Rossi, 
Insurance in Elizabethan London: The London Book of 
Order (PhD University of Cambridge 2012) 173-176; 
Van Niekerk, The Development, vol. 1, 376-379.
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ordinance, and not the princely government.64 All the petitioners of February 
1558 recognised the need for reform but insisted that any project of ordinance 
should necessarily be deliberated in conjunction with merchants, both 
because of their expertise and in order to seek their consent.65 Theretofore, 
consultations had been the normal practice, and merchants stressed that 
they should also be involved in devising terms of contract and rules of 
thumb. In other words, the majority of merchants did not protest against an 
ordinance regulating the contents of contracts. Instead, they reacted against 
the restrictions of controlled brokerage, against registration and against 
unilaterally imposed legislation.
From October 1557 onwards, the Antwerp magistracy delayed 
Ferrufini’s plans. The Antwerp aldermen, who had not ventured in detailing 
rules of thumb with regard to clauses of contract, also hesitated because 
it proved impossible to reach a compromise.66 The repeated protest then 
turned efforts toward consulting into full negotiations about the contents 
of a princely ordinance, which now also involved the Antwerp municipal 
leaders. In the summer of 1558 the princely government responded to the 
petitions, which the Antwerp magistracy had forwarded, by appointing 
new commissioners Gaspar Schetz, Lazarus Tucher, Gaspar Ducci and 
Anton Palos.67 This selection of a group of commissioners from different 
communities (Dutch, German, Italian and Portuguese merchants) further 
reflects the particularist tendencies of nations, despite the fact that they had 
formally joined forces against Ferrufini’s schemes in February 1558.
In the early autumn of 1558 Ferrufini gave in and downsized his plans 
further by agreeing to the free choice of brokers instead of the earlier proposed 
monopoly of four who were to assist the official registrar.68 Near the end of 
December 1558 and following negotiations with merchants and city officials, 
the four commissioners mentioned wrote a compromise text, together with 
a form of insurance contract. In spite of the opposition to monopolised 
registration, this compromise stated that a superintendent would write 
down all insurance contracts, yet it did confirm that brokerage was to remain 
free. The superintendent could only act as broker if the parties chose him 
as such. The mandatory standard insurance contract that was added to the 
1558 project was in some respects close to the one that had been submitted by 
64 aca, pk, 1019/119, Petition of the Genoese nation, 
s.d., early 1558.
65 aca, pk, 1019/127, Petition of merchants, February 
1558. See also Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 
228 (s. 36-37). See also 231-232 (s. 50).
66 Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 234-235, 
Reminders of the governor-general, dating 25 
October 1557, 23 March 1558 n.s., and 27 June 1558.
67 Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 237. Two of 
them, Gaspar Schetz and Gaspar Ducci, had 
expertise as underwriters. For Ducci, see: 
Hofmeister, ‘Eine Hansische Seeversicherung’, 173 
(contract, July 1531).
68 aca, pk, 1019/91, Explanations by Giovanni Battista 
Ferrufini, s.d. and 141, Letter of the magistracy of 
Antwerp to the prince, 6 October 1558.
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Ferrufini the year before, but it was additionally realigned with the practice 
of the Antwerp municipal court. Since it was a well-accepted custom that 
was also acknowledged by the Antwerp aldermen-judges, insurance after 
loss, which Ferrufini had opposed, was considered legally valid, albeit under 
conditions. In other respects, the compromise corroborated some practices 
should become standard rules, for example barratry, at the expense of nations 
that did not accept them.69
In January 1559, on the basis of the 1558 compromise, the aldermen 
in Antwerp’s city council could finally accept the candidacy of Ferrufini for 
the new office of superintendent.70 By that point, the Antwerp leaders were 
demonstrating particularist and even rent-seeking behaviour themselves. 
Opposition against the registrar had not faded away, but the Antwerp 
administrators tried to get a piece of the pie by luring Ferrufini into a 
financial deal. They combined his nomination with a loan of 8,000 guilders, 
which had to be repaid at a 15 percent interest rate under the condition that 
Ferrufini would receive the central government’s approval of the municipal 
appointment.71 In February and March 1559, the Antwerp executives were 
involved in constant discussions with the princely councils over which level of 
government controlled the superintendent: the Antwerp government tried to 
turn the registrar into an Antwerp officer.72
After obtaining princely authorisation of appointment, Ferrufini 
took the lead in fine-tuning the 1558 compromise into an ordinance. For the 
drafting of the proposal merchants were again consulted, and the drawing up 
of the text took place under close supervision by the Antwerp government.73 
Around the middle of 1559 a proposal was finished74, which was in line 
with the 1558 compromise. However, because of the lasting protests against 
the registration of insurance contracts by one individual officer, it was not 
imposed in the form of an ordinance from either the central government or 
Antwerp. In this regard, there are traces of a lawsuit started by the Portuguese 
nation in an effort to cancel Ferrufini’s appointment.75 In the end, it appears 
unlikely that Ferrufini ever assumed his office, and if he did, he did not hold 
for any length of time.76
69 aca, pk, 1019/140, Report of the royal 
commissioners Schetz, Tucher, Ducci and Palos, 
December 1558.
70 aca, pk, 1019/131, Decision of the Antwerp 
magistracy, 18 January 1559 n.s., 133 (idem, 6 
February 1559 n.s. and 159, Oath taken by Ferrufini 
before the Antwerp magistracy, 15 February 1559 
n.s.
71 Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 249-250.
72 aca, pk, 478/143, Notes of pensionaris Jan Gillis, 
February-March 1559 n.s.
73 aca, pk, 1019/163, Letter of Ferrufini to the prince, 
May 1559 and 161, Letter of the prince to the 
Antwerp magistracy, 18 May 1559.
74 aca, pk, 1019/177, Project of ordinance, 1559. See 
also Génard, ‘Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini’, 261-267.
75 aca, pk, 1019/89, Report, s.d. (probably October 
1561).
76 He is last mentioned in 1561. See aca, cb, 17, f. 
180, Certificate of the Antwerp aldermen, 26 
September 1561.
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After Ferrufini’s death or departure, new plans to nominate a registrar 
were blocked once more in 1563.77 This renewed opposition resulted in a 
unilateral princely law, from October 156378, which contained a mandatory 
contract form that was much stricter than the 1558 compromise.79 In October 
1570 a new registrar, Diego Gonzalez Gante, was appointed by the central 
government and a new princely law similar to the one of 1563 was passed.80 
All this again provoked reaction from Antwerp merchants. Also, in June 
1570 the Antwerp aldermen had proposed rules that hewed closely to the 
1558 compromise in their project of municipal law (costuymen), which had 
been submitted to the princely councils.81 All this resulted in a new princely 
ordinance of January 1571, which now stuck for the most part to the 1558 
solutions, which in this case were imposed as a guideline, rather than a 
mandatory contract.82 There are no traces of any official registrar’s activities 
in Antwerp after 1563 and October 1570, which was most probably due to 
merchants’ refusal to cooperate.
Conclusion
The organisation and regulation of Antwerp’s marine insurance market in the 
middle of the sixteenth century was clearly a source and subject of contention. 
The central government played a vital part in addressing the unrest and in 
seeking solutions. Although they agreed with Ferrufini’s request for the most 
part, the swift intuition of princely officials was to consult those that were 
engaging in marine insurance, doing so well before the massive protests of 
1557-1558. Regulation of the marine insurance market thus was not imposed 
unilaterally by the state. Informing and consulting were key features of the 
political economy in the Low Countries in the 1500s. Nor did regulation 
result from the city government’s adoption of the wishes of the mercantile 
77 De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 81 (referring to a 
letter by governor-general the Duke of Alba of 15 
January 1570).
78 Ordonnantie … Placcaerten van Vlaenderen, vol. 2 
(Antwerp 1662) 307-334 (princely ordinance, 31 
October 1563).
79 D. De ruysscher, ‘Van kade naar stadhuis. 
Informatieuitwisseling, fraudebestrijding en 
gereglementeerde innovatie in Antwerpse 
zeeverzekeringen (ca. 1550-ca. 1700)’, Tijdschrift 
voor Geschiedenis 125:3 (2012) 370-371.
80 On the 1570 registrar, see W. Couvreur, ‘Recht 
en zeeverzekeringspractijk in de 17de en 18de 
eeuwen’, The Legal History Review 16 (1939) 
186-187; De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 80-83; 
Van Niekerk, The Development, vol. 1, 203-205. 
For the 1570 law, see Ch.F. Reatz, ‘Ordonnances 
du duc d’Albe sur les assurances maritimes de 
1569, 1570 et 1571, avec un précis de l’histoire du 
droit d’assurance maritime dans les Pays-Bas’, 
Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor 
Geschiedenis 4th series 5 (1878) 89-105.
81 De ruysscher, ‘Van kade naar stadhuis’, 371.
82 J.-M. Pardessus (ed.), Collection de lois maritimes 
antérieures au XVIIIe siècle (Paris 1838) vol. 4,  
103-119 (princely law, 20 January 1571 n.s.).
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community or of its supple selection of optimal solutions, as has been stressed 
in the work of Oscar Gelderblom. Even though changing circumstances 
invited renewal of the institutional framework, there was no specific formula 
imposed from within by the market.
Similar processes can be observed in the cases of the wine and grain 
trade. In the wine trade of the 1540s there was a serious conflict concerning a 
prohibition and later a tax on the import of French wine. Monopolists were 
held responsible for a price rise and the circumvention of the traditional 
wine staple towns. In this case, the central government displayed a rather 
ambiguous position: monopolies were condemned, though not harshly, since 
the state relied on the credit-lines of the monopoly merchants. Smaller traders 
and staple towns protested here as well, and again it took some time to come 
to an agreement between the different interested parties.83 Yet regulation 
ultimately proved futile and was largely ignored. Gradually the argument 
of free trade in the wine sector became stronger. On the other hand, the 
contrary was true for the grain trade, a basic necessity for many (as opposed 
to wine, which was more of a luxury). In the grain trading sector of the 1560s 
intense lobbying by municipal governments and grain merchants cornering 
the market all tried to influence central government policy; the former to 
maintain social peace and the common good, the latter to continue their 
profit-making schemes. The grain trade thus called for strict regulation – also 
after a compromise was found – and the punishment of monopolists.84
Similarly, finding a compromise on the organisation of brokerage and 
the contents of marine insurance regulations was a difficult enterprise because 
of the diversity of possible remedies and of opinions. The Antwerp magistracy 
proved hesitant, all the while pursuing an agreement among the various 
parties involved. Over time, throughout the consultations and discussions, 
positions were modified and altered until a compromise was reached. 
Following the protests of 1557-1558 prominent merchants accepted open 
access in brokerage, some reluctantly, others after having changed their mind. 
In February 1558, this compromise resulted in Italian nations dropping their 
claim of electing brokers. Under the pressure of the protests nine of Ferrufini’s 
earlier supporters changed their opinion from a brokerage monopoly to 
freedom of choice. Self-aggrandisement and particularism were motives that 
were – overtly or implicitly – present in the debates, but these phenomena 
cannot be conceived as having stifled any optimum economic alternative that 
was ‘out there’ from the start. Such options are evident in the broad range of 
opinions in 1557 and early in 1558 among the opponents of Ferrufini’s plans. 
The compromise that came into being from 1558 onwards was the product 
of these debates. Furthermore, it is telling that elements of the conciliatory 
83 Craeybeckx, Un Grand Commerce d’Importation, 
211-228.
84 Van Dixhoorn, ‘The Grain Issue of 1565-1566’.
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solution reported here could be contested afterwards. To be sure, starting 
in 1558 an official registrar function and a mandatory contract form, in 
combination with free choice of a broker, had come to be established. Yet even 
as part of the many deals struck among all contenders, that compromise did 
not exclude a relapse into earlier positions and, as a consequence, new strife.
Finally, there is yet another argument that concerns the different 
consequences of interacting causes (political, economic) in the legislative 
processes. It is provided by the variations in solutions that were the outcome 
of discussions on marine insurance registration and standard contracts in 
other cities, where marine insurance experienced comparable developments 
to those in Antwerp. In southern European insurance centres such as Burgos 
and Florence for instance, standard contracts had been imposed in 1514 and 
1523 respectively.85 At least in the case of Florence, where in 1524-1526 two 
marine insurance contracts were drawn up on average each day, it has been 
demonstrated that – despite the dominance of a small group of underwriters 
(between 40 and 50 underwriters signed 70 percent of all contracts) – many 
occasional insurers (some 260 to 270) were active there at that time.86 In 
summary, generalising from this detailed case-study of marine insurance in 
Antwerp, this investigation can readily conclude that commercial growth was 
indeed a catalyst for change. Nevertheless, it did not provide for a standard 
of economic behaviour that was anything else but the result of political-
economic constraints and actions involving several interested parties.
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